Asymmetrical Motivations: An Analysis of Argentine-Venezuelan Bilateral Relations by Thomas, Tina M.
Since Hugo Chávez was elected president of Venezuela in 1998, Latin America has experienced the economic and political sway of Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution.  The 
Revolution calls for a unique form of democracy and development 
shaped by Chávez’s idea of socialism.  Countries like Bolivia and 
Nicaragua have enthusiastically answered its rhetoric, whereas 
those like Chile and Brazil have given Chávez a much cooler recep-
tion.  Somewhere along this bipolar divide, however, lies Argentina, 
which has taken quite an “ambiguous” stance in its relations with 
Venezuela (Castaneda 39).  On the one hand, one would expect re-
lations between the two countries to be close, with full cooperation 
in a wide range of areas; Venezuela was one of the few countries 
that helped Argentina after its devastating peso crisis of 2001, and 
the new Perónista in power in Argentina seemed to be part of the 
rise of leftist movements in Latin America.  However, the rhetoric 
of the Kirchners, Néstor and Cristina, is far more cautious than 
that used by their counterparts in Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Ecuador. 
What we find is that definite areas of non-cooperation exist along-
side areas of cooperation, making it the “ambiguous” case of Latin 
America, a puzzle that begs for further investigation. 
eXPlanation of the toPiC
Several scholars have speculated on what can be seen as the 
rising pink tide of Latin America.  Starting with Hugo Chávez’s vic-
tory in Venezuela, a wave of leaders, parties, and movements gener-
ically labeled “leftist” have swept into power in one Latin American 
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country after another.  Chávez’s election was followed by Lula’s in 
Brazil, Kirchner’s in Argentina, Vazquez’s in Uruguay, and Morales’ 
in Bolivia (Castaneda 29).  Many scholars have speculated as to 
why the sudden surge in leftist tendencies has been possible.  New 
York University Professor Jorge Castaneda, for example, attributes 
the cause to the fall of the Soviet Union, Latin America’s extreme 
inequality, and the spread of democratization and democratic elec-
tions (Castaneda 30). 
Castaneda emphasizes that the face of the left in Latin Amer-
ica is not uniform; there are really two lefts in the region.  One is 
open-minded and modern and has radical roots; the other is close-
minded and stridently populist.  The former emphasizes social pol-
icy but within a more or less orthodox framework.  Countries who 
follow such an idea include Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil.  For the lat-
ter group of countries, however, rhetoric is much more important 
than substance, and power is more important than its responsible 
exercise.  These states are more sympathetic to the Bolivarian Revo-
lution and include Venezuela, Bolivia, and Nicaragua.  
In order to illustrate this dyad with an empirical example, one 
can refer to the ways these countries cooperate within international 
organizations.  According to a high-ranking official within a region-
al intergovernmental organization, Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba, and 
Nicaragua are active in criticizing international financial organiza-
tions; they actually want a new International Monetary Fund and 
World Bank.  These four countries are also quick to support each 
other in disagreements.  The other left seems to be less interested in 
Latin American and Caribbean affairs. Chile, for example, believes 
that “they are the most civilized from the institutional point of view” 
(Official).  The country frequently aligns with the United States, 
Europe, and the Pacific Ring against its Latin American neighbors. 
As a telling indication of Chile’s position, President Michelle Bach-
elet spoke for two and a half hours in her State of the Union ad-
dress, yet there was only one mention of Latin America and the 
Caribbean (Official).  Brazil also considers itself a big player in the 
region.  Brazil has attended G8 and Security Council meetings un-
der the request that it represent Latin American views.  However, 
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Brazil does not consult with its neighbors before these meetings, 
and in turn, the other left has become quite agitated (Official). 
Castaneda categorizes Argentina in the second left but with 
its qualification as a “somewhat ambiguous case” (Castaneda 39). 
It is from this remark that I embark on my research project, for 
this ambiguity cannot be so easily disregarded.  From the study of 
the Argentine case, this paper demonstrates that if two developing 
countries enter a bilateral relation with differing motivations, their 
relationship will be ambiguous.  In the Argentine-Venezuelan case, 
Chávez is motivated by ideology while Kirchner is motivated by 
economic need.  The strongest relationships are those with a shared 
ideology on both sides.  This is not the case with Argentina and 
Venezuela, so their relationship contains disagreements alongside 
agreements. 
siGnifiCanCe of the ProjeCt
Understanding the structural forces that govern the Bolivar-
ian Revolution has several important implications. 
First, this work aims to fill a gap in political science and in-
ternational relations research.  Scholarly work on the Bolivarian 
Revolution has been limited to articles in academic journals and 
newspapers.  Books on the subject are not as prevalent.
Several reasons explain this paucity of work.  First, the Boli-
varian Revolution is an entirely new phenomenon, having emerged 
in 1998 after the election of Hugo Chávez.  This social, economic, 
and political movement is very much defined by Chávez, and thus 
attempts to project the roots of the movement to earlier eras of 
Venezuelan history are tenuous.   Scholars grapple with less than 
ten years of history in their attempts to define and analyze the 
movement.  The Chávez regime releases little information to the 
press and what is reported is highly regulated by the regime.  The 
Freedom House index from 2006 rates the freedom of press in the 
country as “not free.”  The summary states: 
A hostile political atmosphere under the government of 
President Hugo Chávez has fostered a steady decline in press 
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freedom over the past several years, and that trend continued 
in 2006. State initiatives have eroded the influence of private 
media, in which the previous dominance of pro-opposition 
outlets has been dwindling. Among other actions, the govern-
ment has enacted legislation prohibiting the broadcast of cer-
tain material, intimidated and denied access to private media, 
attempted to shut down pro-opposition outlets, and harassed 
journalists employed at such outlets. (Freedom House)
Finding work on the relationship between Venezuela and Ar-
gentina has been even more difficult for a third reason.  Most schol-
arly work on the bilateral relations between Venezuela and other 
Latin American countries has focused on those issues of great vis-
ibility.  The Venezuelan-Colombian relation has been emphasized 
because of border permeation and guerrilla warfare. Moreover, the 
American press has specifically stressed this relation because Co-
lombia is one of America’s most faithful allies in the region.  Brazil’s 
relations with Venezuela have been highlighted because of Brazil’s 
role as the dominant power in Latin America.  Venezuela’s relations 
to Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Bolivia have also been broadcast to a 
great degree, mainly because of these countries’ interest in empha-
sizing the spread of the Bolivarian Revolution.  Argentina, though 
a crucial player as this paper will show, often falls under the radar 
of study.  
Second, this research is of particular interest because it fo-
cuses on two developing countries.  It is common for scholars to 
point to relations between developed nations, or between a devel-
oped and developing nation.  With this focus, we miss the dynam-
ics of a huge swath of foreign policy that concerns only developing 
countries.  Specifically, this project emphasizes the importance of 
ideology in the foreign policy of developing countries, which cur-
rent schools of thought do not stress.  
Finally, this project has great implications for policy decisions 
made by the United States regarding this region.  Understanding 
how bilateral relations work in South America and what motivates 
leaders like Hugo Chávez should be a central element in crafting 
U.S.  foreign policy toward Latin America.
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These last two points will be discussed at greater length in 
this paper since their implications are worthy of more detailed ex-
planation.  To address the lack of research, I traveled to Venezuela 
and Argentina in the summer of 2008 to collect sufficient data. 
Much of what follows in this report is from my observations and 
field study.  
review of international relations theory
An analysis of the Argentine-Venezuelan relationship is diffi-
cult without using some conceptual frameworks to aid understand-
ing.  Realism, liberalism, and constructivism have been regarded 
as the most prevalent schools of thought in international relations 
theory.  It is my belief that these theories cannot in and of them-
selves completely explain every international situation, but they 
will be enumerated upon here in order to provide background for 
understanding Chávez and Kirchner’s general motivations for en-
gaging with each other.  
I will demonstrate that constructivism can be used to explain 
the crux of Chávez’s foreign policymaking with regard to Argen-
tina, while liberalism better describes Kirchner’s actions toward 
Venezuela.  I support this claim in the next sections of this paper, 
where I draw upon the history of the countries’ generally lukewarm 
relationship and the marked affinity that began when Kirchner be-
came president in Argentina.  Through first-hand accounts from 
my research this past summer and a review of secondary sources, I 
will suggest that although the countries are closer than ever before 
in their history, Kirchner and Chávez approach the relationship 
with different motivations.  As a result, the alliance between the 
two is ambiguous, thus explaining Argentina’s position apart from 
the two lefts of Latin America.  
Realism
In realism, the principle actors in world politics are states, 
rather than non-governental organizations (NGOs) and multina-
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tional corporations (MNCs).  Realists approach world politics in 
a very Hobbesian manner: politics involves a struggle for power 
between states in pursuit of their national interests.  Domestic is-
sues play no role in determining foreign policy, so states cannot be 
driven by economic or social goals.  Thus, the role of ideology takes 
a backseat to more rational drivers such as the need for survival and 
the protection of sovereignty, and, in order to achieve these goals, 
a state will try to amass resources (“Introduction to International 
Relations”).  
Realism does not adequately explain the actions of Chávez 
and Kirchner.  Chávez is highly motivated by ideology, and not nec-
essarily rationality.  Though he frames his Bolivarian Revolution 
as protecting Latin America from imperialism, his actions are all 
but rational.  As for Kirchner, domestic issues play a central role in 
shaping his foreign policy.  His goals are largely economic.  He de-
pends on the financial support of Venezuela to sustain his country. 
This all contradicts a central component of realist thought.  
Liberalism
A branch of liberalism called interdependence theory was de-
veloped by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye to refer to complex 
transnational interdependencies between states.  Interdependence 
theorists note that such relations, particularly economic ones, are 
increasing, while the use of military force and power balancing are 
decreasing.  Reflecting on these developments, they argue that the 
decline of military force as a policy tool and the increase in eco-
nomic forms of interdependence should increase the probability 
of cooperation among states (Beavis).   Neoliberalist theory is an-
other school of liberalism that believes nation-states are, or at least 
should be, concerned primarily with absolute gains rather than rel-
ative gains compared to other nation-states.  Neoliberalists argue 
that the line between domestic and foreign policy often becomes 
blurred (Keohane & Nye).  As will be shown, Kirchner’s foreign 
policy towards Chávez is best explained by this theory.  
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Constructivism
Constructivism seeks to demonstrate how core aspects of in-
ternational relations are socially constructed, that is, how they are 
given their form by ongoing processes of social practice and interac-
tion.  The theory holds “(1) that the structures of human associa-
tion are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material 
forces, and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors 
are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature” 
(Wendt 1).  This is the best framework to understand Chávez’s in-
terest in Kirchner.
Asymmetrical Motivation
Literature on these traditional theories of international rela-
tions tends to describe a particular situation as falling completely 
within one of these camps.  None of the literature I have encoun-
tered explains a case where countries approach their relations with 
different motivations, when one theory can be used to describe one 
party while another theory best describes the other.  Traditional 
international relations theories do not necessarily preclude a situ-
ation where two countries enter into a relationship with different 
motivations, but they say nothing about what transpires when this 
occurs.  
This paper will develop a new idea, which I have termed “asym-
metrical motivation,” to describe the situation in which two parties 
have starkly different motivations for entering a relationship.  A 
bilateral relation where the two parties embody similar motivations 
is more clearly definable than one governed by asymmetrical moti-
vation.  As such, in Latin America, the liberalist-constructivist re-
lation of Argentina-Venezuela has a more ambiguous nature than 
the constructivist-constructivist motivation of Venezuela-Bolivia 
and Venezuela-Nicaragua and the liberalist-liberalist motivation 
of Venezuela-Brazil and Venezuela-Chile.1  Moreover, along this 
1 The liberalist-liberalist dyad will not be discussed at greater length in this paper, due to 
space constraints. Chávez knows that strong economic cooperation with Brazil and Chile 
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gradation of relations, those countries that share a similar ideol-
ogy are closest allies.  This observation stresses the importance of 
shared ideology in international relations, but particularly among 
developing nations.  Financial dependence on another nation is not 
enough to engender good relations.  This, coupled with ideological 
affinity is the best recipe for a strong alliance.
history of arGentine-venezuelan relations
In order to understand the uniqueness of the contemporary 
Argentine-Venezuelan bilateral relation, we must understand the 
history of the ties between these two countries.  Argentina and 
Venezuela have never had particularly close relations, contrary to 
what those in both governments would like their citizens to believe. 
Thus, their relatively close affinity today requires explanation. 
 
The Early Years
Officials in both the Argentine and Venezuelan governments 
are keen to have people believe that the two countries have histori-
cally had close ties, and that the current era is simply a continua-
tion of such a past.  In Relaciones Diplomaticas entre Venezuela-
Argentina: 1833-1999, for example, then-Venezuelan ambassador 
to Argentina, Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia, describes the 166-year 
history of bilateral relations between the two countries as marked 
by “solidarity, close cooperation, and excellence,” noting a speech 
made by Argentine Foreign Minister Adalberto Rodríguez Giava-
rini in 2000: “Argentina will never forget the attitude of Venezuela 
in the past, the attitude in the present, and the attitude the State 
pronounces for the future” (Parejo Hernández).   However, the evi-
dence for such a close relation is weak; I found in my research only 
two incidents in the above period that brought the countries close 
is necessary for his country, but he does not see ideological affinity and therefore, there are 
limits to how much he courts Brazilian and Chilean support. The Brazilian ambassador to 
the United States told me that the Venezuela-Brazil relationship is strategic and nothing 
more.
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together.  
The first close relation was when the two countries began 
their respective processes for independence within a month of each 
other in 1810.  Simón Bolívar and José de San Martín, the two 
heroes of Latin American independence, came from Venezuela and 
Argentina, respectively, and the affinity between them was clear.  In 
1822, Bolívar wrote to San Martín: “It is with great satisfaction, 
dignified friend and sir, that I give you, for the first time, the title 
that my heart has guarded for a long time.  I call you Friend and 
this name will be the only one that we should keep for life” (Parejo 
Hernández 13).  Dr. Roger Capella, former Venezuelan ambas-
sador to Argentina under Chávez, also characterized the historic 
relationship between Venezuela and Argentina only in regards to 
Bolívar and San Martín (Capella).  
The second period of affinity was during the Falklands War 
between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the Falkland 
Islands (known to Argentines as the Malvinas).  The Falkland 
Islands lie in the South Atlantic Ocean east of Argentina.  Their 
name and sovereignty had long been disputed.  The Falklands War 
began on April 2, 1982, when the Argentines invaded and occu-
pied the Islands and South Georgia, and ended with the Argentine 
surrender on June 14, 1982 (Smith).  Before the war even began, 
Venezuela was one of the first countries to declare solidarity with 
Argentina over the sovereignty dispute.  Venezuela decided to sup-
port Argentina because of its own belief in self-determination and 
non-intervention.  Venezuela made this position clear in various 
international settings, including meetings of the Organization of 
American States and the United Nations (Luna).  
These two incidences of close cooperation are not enough 
to deduce that relations have been strong throughout the history 
of these two nations.  Instead, according to the vast majority of 
my interviewees, Argentine-Venezuelan relations have historically 
been fairly distant and lukewarm.  Differences in their interests and 
cultures did not compel the two nations to engage naturally or ex-
tensively with each other.  
Venezuelans descend from a very mixed background, from 
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African, European, and indigenous ancestors; essentially, they have 
a Caribbean culture.  Argentines descend from Italians and Span-
iards; their heritage is distinctly European.  According to Francisco 
Monaldi, professor at the Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Ad-
ministración (Advanced Institute for Administrative Studies), even 
the way they do business is different.  Argentines are harsher and 
more direct.  Hence, they give off the impression of being arrogant 
and pretentious.  Monaldi illustrates this with a telling example 
from within SIDOR, an Argentine steel company with a produc-
tion base in Venezuela: “When Argentinean workers came to work 
at SIDOR in Venezuela, their interactions with the Venezuelan 
workers were poor.  Their clashing cultures did not allow them to 
work well together.  The Argentines actually had to bring in Mexi-
can workers to ease the transition and relations with the Venezu-
elans” (Monaldi).  
The two countries are in completely different subsystems of 
Latin America.  Venezuela is situated on the Caribbean, a region of 
great strategic importance to the United States.  Venezuela’s neigh-
bor is Gran Colombia, which includes the Panama Canal (an en-
trance for China) and Colombia.  In contrast, the Southern Cone 
region, which encompasses Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay, is 
important to Argentina (Scholar).  Because of these different loca-
tions, the two countries have vastly different interests.  Venezuela is 
oil rich; Argentina is a middle-tier player in energy resources, but 
a crucial one in food production.  Jonathan Coles, the Venezuelan 
Minister of Agriculture from 1990-1993, summed up the histori-
cal relationship between the two countries well: “There was zero 
interest in Argentina during my term as Minister.  The Southern 
Cone was just seen as totally different.  San Martin and Bolivar had 
their meeting and that was it” (Coles).  
The Menem, the de la Rúa, and the Duhalde Years
When Hugo Chávez assumed the presidency in 1999, he 
maintained this lukewarm relationship with Argentina for several 
years, during the presidencies of Carlos Menem, Fernando de la 
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Rúa, and Eduardo Duhalde.  He shifted his behavior when Néstor 
Kirchner was elected (Edmundo Gonzalez).
During his campaign, Chávez only visited three countries in 
Latin America: Brazil, Argentina, and Colombia.  In Argentina, he 
met with President Carlos Menem.  There were certain sympathies 
between the two leaders, but Chávez was only really interested in 
being a part of Mercosur, a regional trade agreement to promote 
free trade and fluid movement of people, currency, and goods. 
Chávez visited Brazil and Argentina because they were the two 
powerhouses of the organization.   Chávez was so adamant about 
securing a spot in Mercosur that Carlos Menem was the only Lat-
in American president to have a private meeting with Chávez on 
the day of his inauguration.  In that 7:30 a.m. meeting, only eight 
people were present: Hugo Chávez, Edmundo Gonzalez, Carlos 
Menem, and five other Argentines (Edmundo Gonzalez).  When 
Chávez assumed office in 1999, the United States called govern-
ments throughout Latin America to ask their opinion of the new 
Venezuelan president.  The person who spoke most highly about 
Chávez to U.S. President Bill Clinton was Carlos Menem.  How-
ever, this was only because Chávez asked him to do so (Edmundo 
Gonzalez).  So, though cordial, the relationship with Menem was 
not particularly defined by a shared ideology, only pragmatic in-
terests.  In fact, disagreements between Chávez and Menem soon 
arose.  For example, there were differences concerning the essence 
of democracy and the creation of a new constitutional assembly in 
Venezuela (Edmundo Gonzalez).  All in all, the Argentine-Ven-
ezuelan relationship maintained the same rapport as in past years.  
When Fernando de la Rúa came to power in Argentina in 
December 1999, Chávez did not attend the inauguration.  He sent 
Vice President José Rangel instead.  The first time de la Rúa and 
Chávez met was a few months later at the inauguration of the pres-
ident of Uruguay, Jorge Batlle, in March 2000.  Relations became 
worse when, later that year, treaties and agreements between Ven-
ezuela and Argentina failed to crystallize.  In Argentina, Chávez 
was not particularly popular—he appeared half-guerrilla, was still 
part of the military, and he had participated in a coup.  As such, 
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there was apprehension toward Chávez in Argentina because of the 
country’s own troubled past with military dictatorship and coups. 
However, Rangel sought to improve relations.  Edmundo Gonzalez 
actually suggested that Rangel go to Buenos Aires for the second 
time in 2000.  Later that year, Adalberto Rodríguez Giavarini came 
to Venezuela to mend relations which then became fluid and dip-
lomatic, but nothing more significant or special (Edmundo Gon-
zalez).
In December 2001, Fernando de la Rúa was forced to end 
his term as president in response to protests against his handling 
of the economic crisis.  Eduardo Duhalde replaced him.  Duhalde 
seemed to have some sympathy for Chávez.  At the meeting of the 
Grupo de Río en Costa Rica, for example, Duhalde supported the 
democracy of Venezuela and adamantly opposed the elite coup at-
tempt of April 2002.  Relations seemed to be getting better, but 
Duhalde was not in power long enough to fortify relations (Ed-
mundo Gonzalez).  
néstor KirChner anD ChanGes to the relation
The period of 2003-2004—when Néstor Kirchner assumed 
power in Argentina—was a significant turning point in the rela-
tionship between the two countries.  However, those working for 
the Argentine and Venezuelan governments, though they recog-
nized a marked increase in commerce between the two nations, did 
not sense a political change.  Moreover, the newfound commercial 
affinity just “balanced their historical unity” (Binaghi).  This section 
will show that the two countries did actually become significantly 
closer, both economically and politically, with the start of Néstor 
Kirchner’s term.  
Increased Economic Affinity 
The economic affinity between Argentina and Venezuela 
since 2003 has been substantial.  The commerce between them 
does not balance their historical unity; it goes above and beyond 
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any relation they may have had before.  Between 1999 and 2002, 
Argentine exports to Venezuela actually decreased slightly; the 
same was true of exports out of Venezuela to Argentina.  In total, 
the commercial exchange between the two nations decreased from 
about $300 billion to $152 billion.  Lukewarm political relations 
seemed to parallel economic ties during the presidencies of Me-
nem, de la Rúa and Duhalde in Argentina.  A change came in 2003, 
however, with an even greater spike in 2004.  In these years, the 
total commercial exchange increased, and nearly tripled between 
2003 and 2004.  The export of petroleum in particular doubled 
from 2003 to 2004, and then increased nearly twenty-fold between 
2004 and 2005.  Whereas the value of petroleum sold to Argentina 
used to equal the value of non-petroleum products, this changed 
dramatically in 2004 and by 2007, petroleum made up nearly 
93.25 percent of all exports to Argentina (Asociación Venezolana 
de Exportadores).  Although exports to the rest of the world also 
increased during these years, the rate of increase did not nearly ri-
val the rate of increase to Argentina.  Whereas total exports to the 
world increased by about 24 percent between 2001 and 2007, total 
exports to Argentina increased by about 192 percent in the same 
time period.  Chávez spent more than twice the amount of money 
on Argentina from 2005 to 2007 than he spent on even his closest 
allies, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Ecuador.  The timing of this spike 
in economic activity thus emphasizes Chávez’s particular interest 
in maintaining close relations with the new Argentine president, 
Néstor Kirchner, as it corresponded with Kirchner’s assumption of 
power (Asociación Venezolana de Exportadores).  
As further evidence, both Argentina and Venezuela have 
significantly increased their services and activities since 2003 
in order to keep up with the new economic affinity between the 
two nations.  For example, the Instituto Nacional de Tecnología 
Agropecuaría (INTA) and the Instituto Nacional de Tecnología 
Industrial (INTI) are public, decentralized institutions in Argen-
tina that have demonstrated increased activity during Kirchner’s 
presidency, most notably in their relations with Venezuela.  INTA 
provides the technical “know-how” to improve agrarian functions 
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in countries throughout Latin America; farmers learn how to man-
age agricultural machines, how to produce the best milk, and other 
skills.   According to Javier Binaghi, Secretary of the Economic-
Commercial Division of the Argentine Embassy in Caracas, INTA 
provided 33 courses to Venezuelans last year (Asociación Venezo-
lana de Exportadores).  This year they are providing 55 courses, 
with an enrollment of over 600 Venezuelan students (Cipolla).  In 
2007, INTA sent a permanent representative to Caracas, Venezu-
ela’s capital, for the first time in its history.  INTI, on the other 
hand, provides the “how-to” information for those in the agrar-
ian business.  INTI coordinates, assesses, and designs industrial 
technology and factories of the state, called “fabricas,” throughout 
South America.  According to Federico Merke, Academic Sub-Sec-
retary of the Argentine Council for International Relations, INTI 
used to primarily concern itself with quality control.  However, this 
changed with the arrival of Enrique Martin as the new president 
of INTI, who is widely regarded as a fervent Chavismo, that is, 
one who is the sympathetic to the left-wing ideology espoused by 
Chávez.  Martin is changing the institutional mission of INTI into 
one of “inventing solidarity through technology.” Over a hundred 
Venezuelans are now enrolled in INTI classes to learn about social 
cooperatives (Merke).  
The history of the Cámara de Comercio Venezolano-Argen-
tina (Venezuelan-Argentinean Chamber of Commerce) is also a 
telling indication of how economic relations between the two coun-
tries have changed with the rise of Kirchner.  The Cámara works 
with Argentine companies seeking to initiate operations in Ven-
ezuela.  The organization determines what documents are needed 
to enter Venezuela, how to work with the exchange control system, 
what permission is needed, and other technicalities.  The Cámara 
was formed in 1973, but went through a prolonged period of inac-
tivity during the latter half of the twentieth century.  Its function 
was only revitalized in 2003, coinciding with the start of Kirchner’s 
presidency.  The organization realized that an immense number of 
treaties were being signed between Venezuela and Argentina, and 
so it was in their best interest to restart operations (Borguillos).  
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Increased Political Affinity 
“Before Chávez, Venezuela never cared about Argentina. 
But, that has completely changed” (Lladós).   This is quite true 
even when considering the newfound political affinity between the 
two nations.  Juan Battalame, an expert on national security, gave 
the example of his classroom in Buenos Aires.  In the 1990s, there 
were no military officers from Venezuela taking his course.  Today, 
there are four to five in his class but only two Americans and two 
European military officials (Battalame).  
Cooperation between the two nations in joint venture projects 
also seems to be at an all-time high.  In February 2007, Chávez and 
Kirchner opened the first joint-venture oil well in the Venezuelan 
state of Anzoategui, in the Ayacucho 6 block.  This venture is part 
of the so-called Magnificent Reserve plan in which the Uruguayan 
state company, the National Fuel, Alcohol, and Portland Adminis-
tration, is also a partner.  In the same month, the two nations also 
announced the creation of Banco del Sur, a regionally controlled 
multilateral lender intended to lessen South America’s economic 
dependency on rich countries.  In August 2007, Argentina and 
Venezuela pledged new oil and natural gas investments in Bolivia, 
which is seeking new investors after nationalizing its energy sector 
in 2006 (Bank Information Center).  
Argentina approved Venezuela’s bid for entry into Mercosur 
even as the issue was still being hotly debated in Brazil and Para-
guay.  In March of 2008, Néstor Kirchner allowed Chávez to use 
Argentina for a rally attacking U.S. President George W.  Bush, 
who was visiting neighboring Uruguay.  Under the Kirchner ad-
ministration, 40 of the 140 bilateral agreements Argentina has 
have been with Venezuela (Russell).  
the “ambiGuous” Case of arGentina
Though the political relations between the two nations has 
grown stronger since the presidency of Néstor Kirchner, there have 
been clear constrictions, hence the ambiguity of their relationship. 
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Venezuela asked Argentina to join the Bolivarian Alternative 
for the People of our America (ALBA), an international coopera-
tion organization based on the ideas of socialism and economic 
integration.  Argentina issued a conditional acceptance. For ex-
ample, Argentina wanted to receive some benefits of ALBA, like 
energy and economic help, but did not want to receive Cuban doc-
tors, educational help, or an ALBA house.  This clearly illustrates 
Argentina’s need for financial support from Venezuela but also its 
reluctance for sharing Venezuelan ideology.  This act was indicative 
of Argentina’s ambiguity towards Venezuela, seeming almost “half-
in and half-out” (Luna).  
Argentina’s actions within intergovernmental organizations 
also symbolize its ambiguous stance.  While Argentina actively 
supports the Venezuelan approach in criticizing the international 
system, they are very careful in passing judgment about the domes-
tic policy of other Latin American countries.  They value the idea of 
non-interventionism, and so are hesitant to criticize the domestic 
policy choices made by other countries, unlike Venezuela and Bo-
livia  who have no qualms in condemning others’ domestic policies 
(Official).  
As for the joint venture projects between the two nations, in 
a conversation with Catalina Smulovitz, Director of the Depart-
ment of Political Science and International Studies at the Univer-
sidad Torcuato di Tella in Buenos Aires, it was pointed out that 
most of these projects have not been started, or if they have, efforts 
have been halted in the middle of production.  The reason for such 
stagnation seems to be that not enough money is being funneled 
into these projects, and Kirchner may be doing this purposely.  This 
would suggest that although Argentina may owe Venezuela for its 
bond purchases, Argentina is hoping eventually to wean itself off 
Chávez and Venezuela (Smulovitz).  
huGo Chávez’s interest in arGentina 
In order to address this ambiguity, we must understand the 
motivations behind this relationship.  As shown earlier, both real-
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ism and liberalism are inadequate in explaining the motivation of 
the Venezuelan president.  Ideology plays a central role in Chávez’s 
foreign policy, and only constructivism properly accounts for such 
a dimension.  
Constructivism as an Explanation 
Those who seek rational explanations for Chávez’s behavior 
towards Argentina may point to the Argentine peso crash of 2001. 
The critical period of Argentina’s economic crisis started in 1999 
with the decrease of real GDP.  The peso then crashed in 2001 
to a third of its value, a devastating blow to the Argentine people. 
using a rationalist approach, one would think that Chávez would 
have given aid to Argentina immediately when the currency failed. 
However, the economic and political relationship between the two 
nations did not strengthen until 2003, two years after the economic 
crisis had peaked.  Chávez did not start buying bonds or selling pe-
troleum to the ailing country until Kirchner entered office in 2003. 
Why was this the case? According to Edmundo Gonzalez, Chávez 
wanted to wait for someone who seemed to share his own mind-
set to become the Argentine president before courting the country 
(Edmundo Gonzalez).  Carlos Moneta, who worked in the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs at the beginning of Kirchner’s term support-
ed this claim, saying that this interest in Argentina came as soon as 
Kirchner entered office (Moneta).  In fact, Venezuela’s constitution 
itself mandates that the country engage with other Latin American 
countries to promote the Bolivarian Revolution: 
The people of Venezuela…in invoking the historical exam-
ple of our Liberator Simón Bolívar…with the supreme goal 
of reestablishing the Republic…which promotes the peace-
ful cooperation between the nations and drives and consoli-
dates the Latin American integration in accordance with the 
principle of non-intervention and self-determination of the 
peoples, the universal and indivisible guarantee of the hu-
man rights, the democratization of the international society, 
nuclear disarmament, ecological equilibrium and the juridical 
environmental assets and the common and irrenounceable 
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[sic] patrimony of humanity...decrees the following...” (Con-
stitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela)
Chávez only found the ability to do this through what he saw 
as an ideological affinity with Néstor Kirchner.  
Kirchner was a Peronist, and in Chávez’s mind, this meant 
great similarities to Chavismo.  In fact, on a visit to Argentina, 
Chávez proclaimed that he had read Juan Perón’s biography and 
he could indeed call himself a Peronist (Asbert).  Both Perón and 
Chávez share a very similar background.  “Though Hugo Chávez 
has been compared to socialist icons such as Fidel Castro and Sal-
vador Allende, his military background places him squarely with 
Juan Perón.  Castro was a lawyer turned guerrilla fighter and Al-
lende was a career parliamentarian while Chávez and Perón own 
their pre-political careers to the military” (“Perón & Chavez: Sepa-
rated at Birth?”).  Juan Perón had formative experiences abroad as 
a young man in the military.  He was present in Spain, for example, 
during the civil war.  He witnessed the deep ideological rifts that fu-
eled that conflict.  In Il Duce’s Italy, Perón saw elements of the cor-
poratist vehicle of social control.  Combined, Perón’s travels explain 
in part the kind of paternalistic populist society he sought to con-
struct in Argentina.  Hugo Chávez, like Perón, became inspired by 
international experience, specifically the Peruvian military regime 
of Juan Velasco.  The political program of Velasco’s regime centered 
on Plan Inca, which included nationalizations of foreign oil compa-
nies, land reform, and normalized relations with the Soviet Union 
and Cuba.  Chávez has sought to reconstruct a similar system in 
his own country.  The Peronismo and Chavismo that arose from 
such experiences, however, were not ideologies in the intellectually 
rigorous sense of the term, and in this regard, the two leaders share 
another similarity.  Nearly everyone I spoke with classified both 
Peronismo and Chavismo as a “way of doing politics” or “catchall 
politics” (Calle).   Both Perón and Chávez incorporated elements of 
socialism, fascism, communism, and even elements of corporatism 
into movements that do not strictly fall into one category versus an-
other.  Finally, both leaders used populism as the overarching dis-
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course to support the people rather than the elites.  They depended 
on the reaction of mass audiences and so they sought to give audi-
ences what they desired (Marcano & Tyszke).
The importance of ideology in Chávez’s foreign policy can be 
demonstrated even further by his actions following his triumph in 
the recall referendum of 2003.  With a new injection of confidence, 
Chávez sought to make the Bolivarian Revolution even more influ-
ential in his foreign policymaking.  In November 2004, Chávez or-
ganized a meeting with all the ministers, vice-ministers, governors, 
and the Minister of Defense, to present a PowerPoint highlighting 
what changes would be made to his foreign policy.  Some ideas in-
cluded enhancing relations with the common people and solidifying 
Bolivarian circles and ties (Gerbasi).  Essentially, Chávez wanted a 
new international order—a multipolar world against capitalism, 
aligned with emerging countries like Cuba, Argentina, India, Chi-
na, and Russia (Mazzei).  Even those within the government recog-
nized his radical vision for a new type of foreign policy.  Dr. Roger 
Capella, former ambassador to Argentina who was removed from 
his post by Argentina for alleged ties to Iran, said that Venezuelan 
foreign policy indeed entered a new era around 2003 and 2004. 
According to Cappella, Venezuela used to be a country without any 
foreign policy.  Its foreign policy was wholly based on the United 
States: “Whatever was the foreign policy of the United States, was 
the foreign policy of Venezuela.  Chávez finally released the coun-
try from its imperial hold in 2003-2004 by turning to Latin Ameri-
can countries, like Argentina, instead” (Capella).    
Realist explanations for Chávez’s behavior are weak when 
compared to this constructivist explanation.  Both economically 
and politically, his decision to ally with Argentina cannot be con-
sidered rational.  
First of all, Venezuela was the only country that bought Ar-
gentine bonds after the peso crisis of 2001.  All other countries and 
international financial institutions deemed any kind of purchase 
of bonds too risky.  Indeed, if Argentina defaults again, the bonds 
that Venezuela bought are going to be of little value.  The risk that 
Chávez’s actions have brought has been demonstrated in the statis-
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tics: “Venezuelan bonds fell for a second day, with the nation’s debt 
trading at more than 6.5 percentage points above United States 
Treasury securities.  That puts Venezuela behind only Argentina, 
also struggling with rising inflation, in economic risk measures of 
large Latin American countries” (Romero).  There is some profit 
the Venezuelan government makes from this purchase of bonds, 
however, that should be recognized.  This profit occurs because of 
the two exchange systems that exist in the country—the official 
rate of 2.15 and the black market rate of 3.30.  After purchasing 
the Argentine bonds, Venezuela sells them for bolivares, not dol-
lars.  Individuals do not mind buying the bonds for more than 2.15 
because they can sell it for 3.30.  So, Venezuela can sell the bonds 
at 2.55, for example, and claim a profit.  However, a lot of corrup-
tion underlies this process.  Venezuela sells the bonds to favored 
banks, using unbridled discretion.  Banks give a commission or fee 
to the Venezuelan government in return.  Then, the banks can sell 
the bonds at 45 cents more, for example, at 3.00 bolivares, which 
is a profitable deal.  These select banks benefit, as well as select 
individuals in the Venezuelan government.  The entire country, 
however, does not.  Moreover, this exchange system undermines 
the country’s own foreign exchange system.  According to all the 
economists I spoke with, Venezuela could be achieving better with 
the dollars they are using to buy the Argentine bonds.  Thus, this 
practice, though profitable for some, is ultimately harmful to Ven-
ezuela as a whole (Monaldi).  
Moreover, the diesel and fuel oil that Venezuela produces is 
not of the quality that Argentina needs or requests.  It contains too 
much sulfur and other excess compounds.  Therefore, in order to 
sell petroleum to Argentina, Venezuela must first buy the refined 
product from Mexico and Norway, and then send it to Argentina. 
Venezuela also sells this oil to Argentina at important discounts. 
Overall, there is no economic gain from this transaction (Diego 
Gonzalez).  The debt of PDVSA, the Venezuelan state oil com-
pany, has thus been increasing at an extraordinary rate.  Officially, it 
has $16 billion dollars of debt, but this is only international debt.  If 
internal debt and labor are included, that figure rises to about $30 
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billion.  During Diego Gonzalez’s time as an engineer at PDVSA 
in the 1990s, debt was only $2-3 billion at most (Diego Gonzalez). 
In fact, according to anonymous observations made by a financial 
planner, the company that does the current auditing of PDVSA 
cannot actually properly audit because PDVSA is a “mess” (Finan-
cial Planner).   
Instead, could Chávez have a political reason for aligning 
with Argentina? He does want to acquire political power in order 
to combat American power.  Juan Battalame, Professor of Interna-
tional Relations at the Universidad Argentina de la Empresa (Ar-
gentine University of Business) calls this the “prestigio de la revo-
lucion” or the “prestige of the revolution” (Battalame).  However, 
politically, Argentina does not have as much sway in the interna-
tional arena as Brazil and Chile, the rising powerhouses of the re-
gion.  Chávez’s relationships with these countries are quite distant, 
though, and this is primarily because Chávez understands that the 
leftist tendencies of Presidents Lula and Bachelet are quite differ-
ent from those of Kirchner.  This is enough to subdue his advances 
towards these countries.  
Chávez knows that economically and politically, he does not 
gain much from his relationship with Argentina, yet he continues 
with the practice.  Thus, his actions cannot possibly be explained 
with realist logic.  Briefly, Chávez does not act from a liberalist lens 
either: power balancing is indeed at the forefront of his agenda. 
Cooperation with the United States is nonexistent and domestic 
issues do not necessarily drive his foreign policy.  Therefore, it ap-
pears that constructivism has played the primary role in Chávez’s 
foreign policy towards Argentina.
KirChner’s interest in venezuela
What explains Kirchner’s willingness to ally with Venezuela? 
In contrast to what Chávez appears to believe, ideology is far less 
of an incentive for Kirchner than it is for Venezuela.  Rather, it is 
economic need coupled with a short-term foreign policy vision that 
determines Kirchner’s relationship with Venezuela.  Kirchner's for-
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eign policy can be explained using a liberalist lens.  
Economic Need
The Argentine peso crisis of 2001 left the country economi-
cally devastated.  Argentina did not have credit in the international 
market, and was billions of dollars in debt.  By this crisis alone, Ar-
gentina became one of the few cases around the world of a country 
that went from being a developed to a developing nation.  And, in 
Argentina’s eyes, no one stepped in to help during this time.  Mem-
ories del Incendio, written by former President Duhalde about the 
economic collapse of his country, claims that the United States “de-
suella la mano,” or de-linked its hands from Argentina (Duhalde). 
The IMF and World Bank were equally culpable in their lack of 
support.  To make matters worse, the governmental structure of 
the country was going through a concurrent upheaval, with a num-
ber of men assuming the position of president over the course of 
the next two years.  However, with the semblance of political per-
manence that came with the rise of Néstor Kirchner, the new presi-
dent also hoped to bring some sort of financial stability.  Kirchner 
took office with a fiery speech that called on Argentines to rethink 
its economic plan.  The 1990s image of Carlos Menem dancing 
with Hillary Clinton in the White House was over; Washington 
had praised Argentina as a model economy in Latin America, but 
Argentina “had fallen doing their homework” (Cardenas).  Kirch-
ner would not stick to this homework any longer.  Although de la 
Rua and Duhalde had indeed engaged with Leftist ideology, it was 
only with Kirchner that a complete restructuring of the domestic 
economic model was completed (Official).  In placing the domestic 
crisis at the top of Kirchner’s priority list, the new president natu-
rally turned to Venezuela, which emerged as the only cushion dur-
ing this time of struggle.  
The extent to which Argentina has depended on Venezuela to 
help the country out of its financial crisis is incredible.  In Decem-
ber 2005, Kirchner decided to liquidate the Argentine debt to the 
IMF in a single payment, without refinancing, for a total of $9.81 
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billion.  The payment was partly financed by Venezuela, which 
bought Argentine bonds en masse.  From 2005 to 2006, Chávez 
bought more than $3 billion worth of bonds from Argentina, is-
sued by the government following the debt restructuring (“An al-
ternative Dracula makes a buck,” The Economist).  In August 2007, 
Chávez bought another $500 million in bonds (Associated Press). 
The total amount of Argentina’s debt held by Venezuela is current-
ly estimated at around US$40 billion (Clarin).  However, the reli-
ance of Argentina on Venezuela for a large portion of its financing 
needs has not been well received in Wall Street circles.  On July 18, 
2006, Goldman Sachs Emerging Markets Research noted: “Instead 
of trying to restore its credibility with the broad capital markets, 
the government keeps on relying on Venezuela as its main credit 
supplier” (“Economy of Argentina”).  
Short-Term Foreign Policy Vision
In Venezuela, Kirchner saw a quick fix to his economic crisis. 
He did not think ahead as to what this relationship with Venezuela 
would mean for the future.  During the peso crisis, the Chief of 
Cabinet organized a meeting of political scientists and other aca-
demics to talk about the crisis and to outline some solutions.  This 
group was called the Cabinet for the Strengthening of Democratic 
Governance.  Julio Burdman, a former member and now Direc-
tor of the School of International Relations at the Universidad de 
Belgrano (University of Belgrano), recalls that the government was 
desperate during this time.  They felt that Argentina was falling to 
pieces.  Their mindset in developing policies was very short-term 
(Burdman).  Yet this mindset still governs much of their foreign 
policy, as Argentina has not yet fully recovered from the crisis. 
Jorge Castro agrees with this idea.  Castro was the Secretary of 
State of Strategic Planning under Menem from 1998-1999.  He 
was a personal counselor to the President for conflicts, econom-
ics, and external affairs.  Castro claims, “Kirchner has no long-term 
strategy.  All the foreign policy he does is based on domestic issues” 
(Castro).  According to Carlos Moneta, Kirchner has even refused 
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to have dinners with presidents of foreign countries when they are 
in Argentina (Moneta).  
In this regard, Kirchner’s way of doing foreign policy is quite 
different from that of Chávez.  Chávez works from the outside in. 
That is, he has envisioned a world governed by the Bolivarian Revo-
lution and has structured his bilateral relations and his domestic 
policy along this line.  Kirchner, on the other hand, works from 
the inside out.  His priority is domestic, and foreign policy is an 
appendage to this (Liendo).  In this way, liberalist thought best ex-
plains Kirchner’s blurring of domestic and foreign policy, as well as 
his economic goals.
The Role of Ideology 
Hugo Chávez thought he was dealing with Perón when he 
first decided to fortify relations with Argentina, but Kirchner leads 
with his own brand of Peronismo, called Kirchnerismo, which has 
proven to differ from Chavismo in three important respects.  First, 
there is disagreement over Jews and Israel.  Argentina is home to 
the largest Jewish population of South America, many of whom 
have loudly expressed their displeasure at the relationship between 
Venezuela and Argentina.  The Jewish population is mainly con-
cerned about Chávez’s ties to Iran.  Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has 
called for the destruction of Israel, and his country is suspected of 
having a hand in the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center 
in Buenos Aires that killed 85 people and wounded more than 200. 
Kirchner, though, has consistently sided with the Jews of his nation, 
refusing to attend the inauguration of President Correa of Ecuador 
because of the presence of President Ahmadinejad (Barrionuevo). 
On another occasion, Kirchner invited Chávez to San Isidro, the 
private residence of the Argentine president.  All the directors of 
the Jewish community were there, unbeknownst to Chávez, and 
Kirchner asked the Venezuelan leader to explain if he was anti-
Jewish or not.  Chávez, of course, replied in the negative, but the act 
firmly cemented the Kirchners on the side of the Jews (Romero).  
Second, they disagree on interactions with Washington. 
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Kirchner is essentially anti-United States, but he understands that 
“even if he does not like his neighbor, he still has to live with him” 
(Romero).  Therefore, Kirchner is far more cautious than Chávez 
with what he says about the United States.  Finally, Kirchner is 
undoubtedly a capitalist.  There exists a strong private sector in Ar-
gentina that has no counterpart in Venezuela because of Chávez’s 
strong aversion to such development.   
Essentially, Kirchner is against the neo-liberalism of the 
1990s and the role of international economic institutions, much 
like Chávez.  By and large they hold starkly different ideological 
views (Merke).   
arGentina eXPlaineD by asymmetriCal motivation
Thus, it has been shown that the primary motivation of 
Chávez for engaging with Kirchner is ideological.  The Venezuelan 
president searches for shared ideology throughout Latin America, 
a process that constructivism explains well.  Kirchner’s primary 
motivation though, for engaging with Venezuela, can only be ex-
plained in liberalist terms.  In order to fulfill his domestic needs, 
Kirchner has conflated domestic policy with foreign policy.  And 
though economic interest pulls Kirchner into Venezuela, ideology 
does not do so with the same vigor.  
For Chávez to acquire strong allies, both economic need and 
ideology must exist on the other side.  This is what one observes in 
the populist left of Latin America.  Leaders like Morales of Bolivia 
and Correa of Ecuador need Chávez for his petrol dollars: “Chávez 
has been replacing the international financial institutions in a way, 
functioning as a source of capital without the conditionalities that 
the Bretton Woods institutions usually impose on borrowing coun-
tries” (Rouaux).  However, these countries also share fundamental 
similarities with the Venezuelan president in regards to ideology. 
Neither economic nor ideological forces, however, pull Lula of Bra-
zil and Bachelet of Chile into such a cozy relationship with Chávez; 
hence they occupy positions in the more distant, social democratic 
left.  
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For Kirchner, however, the forces pull in opposite directions. 
Kirchner seems close to Chávez because he depends on Venezuela 
for financial support, hence the strengthened economic affinity.  But 
there are limits to the friendship Kirchner bestows on Chávez since 
he disagrees with the Venezuelan on important ideological issues. 
Hence, there is ambiguity.  This is even more proof that ideology is 
critical, as economics is not enough to keep Kirchner invested and 
adherent to Venezuela at all times. 
the imPliCations of this researCh
This research has both theoretical and practical implications, 
namely regarding the literature on relations between developing 
nations and foreign policy towards Latin America.  The literature 
concerning relations between developing nations is limited.  And, 
though this project focuses on only one case study, it sheds light 
on certain topics and themes that may be of particular interest in 
the study of developing nations.  Eduardo Mayobre, a specialist 
in energy and oil issues, argues that the major error in the rela-
tions between developing nations is that these countries seek to 
be the same as others in the world.  Unlike the European Union, 
which was formed to regulate commerce that already existed, Latin 
American countries are attempting to foster integration that is sim-
ply not ready to exist in the region.  This is the motivation behind 
Chávez in the Argentine-Venezuelan relationship, and so the long-
term prospects of such an arrangement seem bleak (Mayobre). 
This project also indicates that the role of ideology may be more 
important in the relationship between developing nations than 
developed nations because in developing countries, like Argentina 
and Venezuela, foreign policy is not as institutionalized as it is in 
developed nations.  In Argentina, the relationship with Venezuela 
is not managed by the Foreign Ministry but by the Planning Minis-
ter, Julio De Vido.  During the Néstor Kirchner administration, five 
people in total conducted the foreign affairs of the country: Néstor 
Kircher, Cristina Kirchner, De Vido, Chief of Cabinet Alberto Fer-
nandez, and Secretary to the President Carlos Zanini (Russell).  In 
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Venezuela, Chávez made four fundamental changes to the structure 
of the Foreign Ministry since assuming power.  Before, there was 
one Minister, one Vice Minister, and then Sector Directors who 
were in charge of departments like International Policy, Econom-
ics, Culture, and Judiciary.  Now there is one Minister of Foreign 
Policy, and beneath him five Vice Ministers who are divided by the 
following regions: Africa, North America, Latin America, Asia and 
Oceania, and Europe.  Beneath each Vice Minister, there are other 
departments: Borders, Human Resources, Strategy, Administrative 
Services, Planning, and others. While decentralization is often con-
sidered a form of power sharing, this paper evidences how Chávez 
has ostensibly devolved powers in order to dilute the power of top 
officials.  According to Jesus Mazzei, a diplomat in the Borders divi-
sion for Latin America, this decentralization has allowed Chávez to 
concentrate policymaking power in his hands and a few select oth-
ers (Mazzei). Because of this lack of institutionalized policymaking 
in developing nations like Argentina and Venezuela, the ideologi-
cal basis for foreign relations takes a more prominent role, and de-
pends on the heads of state.  So “if we have another guy in office in 
Venezuela, he may not want to buy Argentine bonds like Chávez is 
doing” (Montamat).  This lack of permanency makes foreign policy 
between these nations quite fickle in nature.  “All the foreign policy 
in Latin America is between presidents.  For example, Venezuela 
just left the Andean Community of Nations [CAN].  It just left 
because Chávez did not like Uribe [President of Columbia].  This 
is the Latin American idea of foreign policy.  Political sympathies 
change a lot in Latin America” (Vera).  
Finally, this project has great implications for foreign policy 
towards Latin America.  We must not forget that: “Although inter-
national relations and foreign policy researchers assume different 
perspectives—macro, in the one case, and micro in the other—the 
foreign policy subfield continues to be intimately linked to the 
broader…approaches that have been the analytical underpinnings 
of the field of international relations after World War II” (Brave-
boy-Wagner).  Specifically, the ambiguity created by asymmetri-
cal motivation could allow a space for third party actors, like the 
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United States, to exert their influence.  As for the specific case un-
dertaken in this thesis, Argentina’s affinity to Venezuela, as shown, 
largely depends on economic need, not ideological affinity.  Under 
the George W. Bush administration, the United States repeatedly 
snubbed Argentina in the belief that Kirchner is strengthening ties 
with Chávez.  In 2007, President Bush avoided Argentina on his 
South American tour, visiting only Brazil and Uruguay.  In March 
2008, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice traveled to only Brazil 
and Chile for meetings, again disregarding Argentina (Barrionue-
vo).  Actions like this are likely to push Argentina further away, 
when the United States could replace Venezuela as the primary 
provider of financial assistance to Argentina.  As an alternative to 
direct assistance, the United States could also grant Argentina ac-
cess to the international market, namely to the Paris Club and the 
International Monetary Fund.  It seems that Argentina needs fi-
nancial assistance more than ideological likeness creating a space 
for the United States to step in.  
ConClusion
This is an exciting time to study this topic: we may currently 
be witnessing a possible shift in relations between Argentina and 
Venezuela.  Venezuela’s own economic system is at risk with the 
recent plummet of oil prices.  The Venezuelan economy depends so 
much on oil that this price drop has been disastrous.  One should 
wonder if Chávez will be able to continue buying Argentine bonds 
and providing the oil that the Kirchners request.  Moreover, with 
Barack Obama’s victory in the recent U.S. elections, Chávez may 
need to recreate or dismantle his paradigm of the imperialist Unit-
ed States, which could mean great changes in the foreign policy of 
a leader so focused on ideology.  It will be interesting to see how 
this theory of asymmetrical motivation functions amidst all these 
changes.  It is my prediction that as Chávez loses his money, he will 
most likely lose alliances as well, with Argentina going first. 
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